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Lobbying on entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011
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The political economy of financial fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2005
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325212
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The political economy of financial systems
Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
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Investor Protection and Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - 2007
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325184
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems
Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325760
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The Political Economy of Finance
Perotti, Enrico - 2013
This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326229
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Investor protection and entry
Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2006
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369
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Countercyclical capital regulation and bank ownership structure
Trani, Tommaso - 2012
This paper develops a macroeconomic framework where the representative bank is owned by inside and outside owners and copes with capital requirements that vary countercyclically. The issuance of outside equity is characterized getting insights from the literature on corporate governance,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625646
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On banking regulation and lobbying
Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019 - This version: January 2019
equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and … politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140