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Garcia-Appendini, Emilia - 2014 - This draft: June 2014

This paper analyzes whether the financial distress of a firm affects the investment decisions of non …-distressed competitors. On average, firms in distress impose indirect costs to non-distressed competitors by increasing costs of credit in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010410806

Determinants of distress in the UK owner-occupier and buy-to-let mortgage markets

Lazarov, Vladimir; Hinterschweiger, Marc - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926043

How important is moral hazard for distressed banks?

Ben-David, Itzhak; Palvia, Ajay; Stulz, René M. - 2020

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic effect of these incentives is an empirical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012216705

The political economy of finance and regulatory capture : evidence from the US Congress

Silano, Filippo - 2023

Congress roll call votes on financial liberalisation were biased by industry-led campaign contributions and lobbying activities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014370438

Bank lobbying : regulatory capture and beyond

Igan, Deniz; Lambert, Thomas - 2019

In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences … through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the … interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework …