Hedge funds offer desirable risk-return profiles; but we also find high management fees, lack of transparency and worse, very limited liquidity (they are often closed to new investors and disinvestment fees can be prohibitive). This creates an incentive to replicate the attractive features of...

The assessment of models of financial market behavior requires evaluation tools. When complexity hinders a direct estimation approach, e.g., for agent based microsimulation models or complex multifractal models, simulation based estimators might provide an alternative. In order to apply such...

A major inconvenience of the traditional approach in portfolio choice, based upon historical information, is its inability to anticipate sudden changes of price tendencies. Introducing information about future behavior of the assets fundamentals may help to make more appropiate choices. However...

Estimation and modelling problems as they arise in many fields often turn out to be intractable by standard numerical methods. One way to deal with such a situation consists in simplifying models and procedures. However, the solutions to these simplified problems might not be satisfying. A...

We investigate portfolio selection with alternative objective functions in a distributed computing environment. In particular, we optimise a portfolio's 'Omega' which is the ratio of two partial moments of the returns distributions. Since finding optimal portfolios under such performance...

We construct portfolios with an alternative selection criterion, the Omega function, which can be expressed as the ratio of two partial moments of the returns distribution. Finding Omega-optimal portfolios, in particular under realistic constraints like cardinality restrictions, requires to...

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...

We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...