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Learning from China? : manufacturing, investment, and technology transfer in Nigeria

Chen, Yunnan; Sun, Irene Yuan; Ukaejiofo, Rex Uzonna; … - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576846

Is the service quality of private roads too Low, too high, or just right when firms compete stackelberg in capacity?

Berg, Vincent A. C. van den; Verhoef, Erik T. - 2011 - Version of 13 May 2011

time or service quality is socially optimal. We find that this result does not hold if capacity and toll setting take place … in separate stages, as then firms want to limit the toll competition by setting lower capacities; or when firms set … higher capacities. In our Stackelberg competition, the firms that act last have few if any capacity decisions to influence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386470

Equilibrium solution concepts in dynamic games : an empirical analysis of price and advertising competition

Slade, Margaret Emily - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000810616

Competing mechanisms and folk theorems : two examples

Atta, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; … - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181557

Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014 - Revised version: May 5, 2014

This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360312

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : a limit theorem a ̀la Cournot

Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio; Ghosal, Sayantan - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346574

Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals

Münster, Johannes - 2005

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366546