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This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a game theoretic framework which explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects. It is argued that such a perspective makes it easier to analyse contextual effects. Moreover, the framework is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429811
. Furthermore, we discuss how such a preference can be integrated in the modelling of utility in order to account for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366516
This note offers two comments on the article "Social Influences towards Conformism in Economic Experiments" by Hargreaves Heap that is to appear in the Economics e-Journal. One relates to the concept of conformism, the other lines out some phenomena where an explicit recognition of group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010464701
Social preferences and social influence effects ("peer effects") are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257221
Social preferences and social influence effects ("peer effects") are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340306
We conduct a modified dictator game in order to analyze the role self-image concerns play in other-regarding behavior. While we generally follow Konow (2000), a cognitive dissonance-based model of other-regarding behavior in dictator games, we relax one of its assumptions as we allow for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010475637
We extend the literature structurally estimating social preferences by accounting for the desire to adhere to social norms. Our representative agent is strongly motivated by norms and failing to account for this causes us to overestimate how much agents care about helping those who are worse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013412658
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014490858
We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than non-consumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011547572
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011988929