We analyze a novel feedback mechanism between market and funding liquidity that causes self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. Financial firms facing funding withdrawals have an incentive to acquire information about their assets. Those with good assets gain by resorting to outside liquidity sources...

Market participants often invest in order to acquire information that pertains to the market itself (e.g. order flow) rather than to fundamentals. This enables them to infer more information from past trades. I show that agents trading on such information, typically high-frequency traders,...

We explore the ability of a macroprudential policy instrument to dampen the consequences of equity mispricing (a bubble) and the correction thereof (the bubble bursting), as well as the consequences for real activity in a production economy. In our model, producers are financed by both bank debt...

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders? characteristics in an electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with...

This paper shows how traders learn from post-trade identity disclosure in a currency limit order market. We establish that identity disclosure reveals information and show how traders react by reversing their order flow in line with the better informed. Informed traders primarily incorporate...

In case of multiple creditors a coordination problem can arise when the borrowingfirm runs into financial distress. Even if the project's value at maturity is enoughto pay all creditors in full, some creditors may be tempted to foreclose on theirloans. We develop a model of creditor coordination...

We characterize pure strategy equilibria of common value multi-unit uniform price auctions under the framework of initial public offerings, where bidders have incomplete private information regarding the value of shares and submit discrete demand schedules. We show that there exists a continuum...

The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...

By allowing for imperfectly informed markets and the role of private information, we offer new insights about observed deviations of portfolio concentrations in domestic relative to foreign risky assets, or home bias, from what standard finance models predict. Our model ascribes the bias to...