A market-leveraged stock unit (MSU) is a form of employee compensation in which the number of shares received on the vesting date depends on the stock price at that time. MSUs have been proposed as a way of overcoming some of the drawbacks of stock options and restricted stock units. In this...

We provide evidence of a strong effect of the underlying stock's illiquidity on option prices by showing that the average absolute difference between historical and implied volatility increases with stock illiquidity. This pattern translates into significant excess returns of option trading...

In this paper, we introduce two classes of indices which can be used to measure the market perception concerning the degree of dependency that exists between a set of random variables, representing different stock prices at a fixed future date. The construction of these measures is based on the...

We examine whether the option market leads the stock market with respect to positive in addition to negative price discovery. We document that out-of-themoney (OTM) option prices, which determine the Risk-Neutral Skewness (RNS) of the underlying stock return's distribution, can embed positive...

We show that options written on stocks with low prices are over-priced. This effect is robust to a variety of tests, controlling for common stock- and option- risk characteristics, and to reasonable transaction costs. Natural experiments corroborate this finding; options tend to become...

Conventional financial theory considers ex-ante that risk, generally measured by the volatility, has to be appropriately rewarded by expected returns. In modern financial markets, there are countless quantitative and systematic strategies which may test and eventually lead to excess returns when...

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO’s perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...