It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over … potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate …

We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the … second, and (b) no firm and the worker it is paired with under the second matching prefer each other to their respective … assignments in the first matching, then no worker prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a …

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs … static results of the decentralized trading outcome with respect to the level of the search frictions. -- Dynamic Matching …