I provide a general framework of firms' financial communication process and investor response to information, moving from disclosure through dissemination to investor response and management response. I then discuss the entrance of social media into firm communications, highlighting both classic...

Firms constantly face new and more stringent tax disclosure requirements and, increasingly, paying a fair share of tax is seen as part of corporate social responsibility. In this paper, we investigate whether mandating qualitative tax disclosure leads to intended outcomes, using, as an exogenous...

Firms constantly face new and more stringent tax disclosure requirements and, increasingly, paying a fair share of tax is seen as part of corporate social responsibility. In this paper, we investigate whether mandating qualitative tax disclosure leads to intended outcomes, using, as an exogenous...

Firms can disclose social information via different channels such as SEC filings, stand-alone sustainability reports, or financial reports. Based on the notion that investors interpret such disclosures from a risk perspective, we analyse how disclosure via each of the three channels relates to...

Institutional investors are highly dissatisfied with the quality of information that they receive about corporate governance policies and practices in the annual proxy. Across the board, they want proxies to be shorter, more concise, more candid, and less legal. The largest complaint involves...

We present evidence that complex disclosure can result from the strategic incentives to shroud information. We implement an experiment where senders are required to report their private information truthfully but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find that senders use complex...

Are pandemics systemically important to modern-day financial markets? This study uses the COVID-19 pandemic as a natural experiment for testing how large-scale pandemics affect the financial markets. Using hand-collected data at the firm level, I find that managers systematically underestimated...

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while...