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We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507775
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
Textbook theory assumes that firm managers maximize the net present value of future cash flows. But when you ask them …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351328
Textbook theory assumes that firm managers maximize the net present value of future cash flows. But when you ask them …, real-world firm managers consistently say that they are maximizing something else entirely: earnings per share (EPS …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250143
This paper examines the impact of SOX on the total cost and the component cost of going public. First, we document a statistically significant increase in non-underwriting expenses of 0.8 percentage points after the introduction of SOX, which is mostly due to an increase in accounting and legal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003749592
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350369
, transaction costs theory, agency costs theory, legal investor protection, investor protection by corporate governance and its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565384
This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521411
This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523499
We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623466