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Entry regulation and the influence of an incumbent special interest group

Evans, John Bussell; Fingleton, John - 2002

entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other entry deterrence models, we are able to investigate how product market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001712316

Entry regulation and the influence of an incumbent special interest group

Evans, John Bussell; Fingleton, John - 2002

entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other entry deterrence models, we are able to investigate how product market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115

Lobbying in Europe : new firm-level evidence

Dellis, Konstantinos; Sondermann, David - 2017

Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed … decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011658573

Drug prices and pressure group activities in the German health care market : an application of the Becker model

Busch, Anne Maria - 2015

This article analyzes the shifts of power relation and influence between pharmaceutical industry (producers), pharmacies, and social health insurers (SHI) in Germany based on drug prices. Since the health care reform of 2004, these interest groups have negotiated fees and discounts among each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529890

The political economy of collective bargaining

Palokangas, Tapio K. - 2002

-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be … regulation in the labour market. In such a case, the political equilibrium is characterized by strong union power and right …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409824

Age of politicians and regulatory reform

Kodila-Tedika, Oasis; Kabange, Martin Mulunda - 2016

This article discusses the relationship between the identity of the rulers of the executive and reform. Thus, we enrich the literature on the determinants of reform and the result of the executive. This is a new and very important literature, as these are the reforms that allow progress. We use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436451

On banking regulation and lobbying

Gersbach, Hans; Papageorgiou, Stylianos - 2019 - This version: January 2019

politicians. We show that bankers and politicians agree on lobbying contributions and capital regulation that renders banks … capital regulation standards from international agreements eliminate lobbying incentives, yielding an efficient and fair …We study the political economy of bank capital regulation from a positive and normative perspective. In a general …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962140

A dynamic theory of regulatory capture

De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2020

Firms have incentives to influence regulators' decisions. In a dynamic setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). This is because the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220065

A dynamic theory of regulatory capture

De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021

Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization

Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2009

policy in a lobbying model taking into account the con.ict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320207