Similar Search Results

How antitrust enforcement can spur innovation : Bell Labs and the 1956 consent

Watzinger, Martin; Fackler, Thomas; Nagler, Markus; … - 2017

We study the 1956 consent decree against the Bell System to investigate whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for innovation and if so, whether compulsory licensing can provide an effective remedy. The consent decree settled an antitrust lawsuit that charged Bell with having...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591035

Political influence and merger antitrust reviews

Mehta, Mihir N.; Srinivasan, Suraj; Zhao, Wanli - 2019

Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064904

How horizontal shareholding harms our economy : and why antitrust law can fix it

Elhauge, Einer - 2018

Empirical evidence that horizontal shareholding has created anticompetitive effects in airline and banking markets have produced calls for antitrust enforcement. In response, others have critiqued the airline and banking studies and argued that antitrust law cannot tackle any anticompetitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011972909

Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!

Budzinski, Oliver; Haucap, Justus - 2019

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Schnittstelle zwischen Recht und Ökonomik in der Wettbewerbspolitik. Aus einer … Rahmen einer positiven Institutionenökonomik der Wettbewerbspolitik analysieren die Autoren informationsökonomische Aspekte … Kartellrechts diskutiert. Schließlich exploriert der Beitrag soziologische Aspekte der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche in der Literatur …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035986

Reverse privatization as a reaction to the competitive environment : evidence from solid waste collection in Germany

Demuth, Juri; Friederiszick, Hans; Reinhold, Steffen - 2018

After earlier waves of privatization, local governments have increasingly taken back control of local service provisions in some sectors and countries and, instead, started providing those services themselves (reverse privatization). Using a unique panel data set on the mode of service provision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824932

The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion

Emons, Winand - 2018 - Version: October 2018

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919342

Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions

Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin - 2020 - Version: January 2020

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159842

Minority share acquisitions and collusion : evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs

Heim, Sven; Hüschelrath, Kai; Laitenberger, Ulrich; … - 2017

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730845

The fight against cartels : a transatlantic perspective

Dargaud, Emilie; Mantovani, Andrea; Carlo, Reggiani - 2013

The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. What differs between the EU and the US is not the basic toolkit for achieving deterrence, but to whom it is targeted. In the EU, pecuniary sanctions against the firm are the only instruments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730980

Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market

Duso, Tomaso; Szücs, Florian; Böckers, Veit - 2017

In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5,000 MW generation capacity as well as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735927