Showing 1 - 10 of 17,820
This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium, in a setting without takeovers and controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries to influence the composition of the shareholder base by accumulating votes and buying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014437023
Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of investors whose capital they manage. Recently, this system has come under intense debate given the growing concentration of voting power among a few asset managers and disagreements over environmental and social issues. Major fund managers now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014337868
This Article contributes to the long-standing and heated debate over dual-class companies by placing a spotlight on a significant set of dual-class companies whose structures raise especially severe governance concerns: those with controllers holding a small minority of the company's equity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011972992
A battle is brewing for control of America's most dynamic companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection from interference or dismissal by public investors through the adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011721539
The desirability of a dual-class structure, which enables founders of public companies to retain a lock on control while holding a minority of the company's equity capital, has long been the subject of a heated debate. This debate has focused on whether dual-class stock is an efficient capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674094
The rise of a small group of investment (asset) managers with an enormous potential to influence corporate decision-making has reinforced attention to shareholder stewardship as one of the pillars of corporate governance. But weak incentives to invest in shareholder oversight and limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507489
Institutional investors vote corporate proxies on behalf of underlying investors and beneficiaries. We show a strong relation between this voting and public opinion on corporate governance (as reflected in media coverage and surveys), with similarly strong results for voting by mutual funds. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411441
We study the interplay between a "one person-one vote" political system and a "one share-one vote" corporate governance regime. The political system sets Pigouvian subsidies, while corporate governance determines firm-specific public good investments. Our analysis highlights a two-way feedback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576634
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. This implies that ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010235904
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards. This implies that ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347682