We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions. -- Coalition formation ; Nash stability ; Partitions …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition … structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a … noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …