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Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings : effects on product market competition

Haas, Samuel de - 2019

Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sus- tainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992347

Corporate governance

Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018

aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257

Governance mandates, outside directors, and acquirer performance

Dahya, Jay; Golubov, Andrey; Petmezas, Dimitris; … - 2016

We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646285

Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control

Jovanovic, Dragan; Wey, Christian - 2013

to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers …. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing PPOs when evaluating merger proposals (which reflects the … current EU merger control regime) invites sneaky takeovers: Acquiring firms strategically use PPOs prior to a full merger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788178

Partial cross ownership and collusion

Haas, Samuel de; Paha, Johannes - 2016

This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524013

Corporate governance and the nature of takeover resistance

Carline, Nicholas F.; Linn, Scott C.; Yadav, Pradeep - 2014 - This version: March 23, 2014

We investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the choice to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337622

International mergers with financially constrained owners

Berg, Aron; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2012

restrictions. This calls for a "financial" efficiency defense in the merger law. We also show that cross-border M&As are not only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625136

Performance benefits of tight control

Gill, Andrej; Visnjic, Nikolai - 2013

This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225758

Information in tender offers with a large shareholder

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Kos, Nenad - 2014 - This version: January 17, 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011814413

The political economy of dominant investors

Perotti, Enrico; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975