We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal "ability". Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly …

admit students that tend to struggle elsewhere. Most of the impact of alternative evaluation is found to be due to their … impact on the applicant pool (sorting), and not because of they are better at identifying successful students keeping the …

admit students that tend to struggle elsewhere. Most of the impact of alternative evaluation is found to be due to their … explained by their impact on sorting and not because they allow programs to select more successful students from a given pool of …