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Investment complementarities, coordination failure and systemic bankruptcyd'

Li, Mei (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003594275

Coordination failure in technological progress, economic growth and volatility

Li, Mei (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003594292

Endogenous inflows of speculative capital and the optimal currency appreciation path

Li, Mei; Qiu, Junfeng - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852776

Why does the US dominate university league tables?

Li, Mei; Shankar, Sriram; Tang, Kam Ki - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003872182

A large trader in bubbles and crashes : an application to currency attacks/ Mei Li; Frank Milne

Li, Mei; Milne, Frank - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003976749

The role of large players in a dynamic currency attack game

Li, Mei (contributor); Milne, Frank (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003594286

The signaling effect and optimal LOLR policy

Li, Mei; Milne, Frank; Qiu, Junfeng - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419288

Central bank screening, moral hazard, and the lender of last resort policy

Li, Mei; Milne, Frank; Qiu, Junfeng - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376721

Uncertainty in an interconnected financial system, contagion, and market freezes

Li, Mei; Milne, Frank; Qiu, Junfeng - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754897

Central bank screening, moral hazard, and the lender of last resort policy

Li, Mei; Milne, Frank; Qiu, Junfeng - 2013

This paper establishes a theoretical model to examine the LOLR policy when a central bank cannot distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks. We study two cases: a case where the central bank cannot screen insolvent banks and a case where the central bank can only imperfectly screen...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790246