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Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien - In: Economic theory 72 (2021) 3, pp. 705-721

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012663379

Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions

Lee, Jaesun; Shapiro, Dmitry - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 212 (2023), pp. 74-107

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Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

Lichtig, Avi; Weksler, Ran - In: Journal of economic theory 210 (2023), pp. 1-22

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Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1001-1026

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635265