Whenever a common resource is scarce, a set of rules are needed to share it in a fairly way. However, most control schemes assume that users will behave in a cooperative way, without taking care of guaranteeing that they will not act in a selfish manner. Then, a fundamental issue is to evaluate...

We introduce a “gradient” to find out the defectors, and further a “topology potential” to characterize the individual’s strategy preference in the prisoner’s dilemma on scale-free networks. It is shown that the cooperators typically locate on the nodes with high topology potential...

This study argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by...

It wasn’t A Beautiful Mind—the book or the movie—that made John Forbes Nash, Jr., famous. It was his work in game theory, a theory that models strategic interactions between people as games. Before Nash, the only games theorists could get a handle on were artificial ones with no real-world...

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative...

What happens when liquidity increases in credit markets and more funds are channeled from borrowers to lenders? We examine this question in a general equilibrium model where financial matchmakers help borrowers (firms) and lenders (households) search out and negotiate profitable matches and...

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal...