Brain drain critiques and human rights advocates have conflicting views on emigration. From a brain drain perspective, the emigration harms a country when emigrants are skilled and the source country is poor. From the human rights perspective, the right “to leave any country, including one's...

Is the brain drain a curse or a boon for developing countries? This paper reviews what is known to date about the magnitude of the brain drain from developing to developed countries, its determinants and the way it affects the well-being of those left behind. First, I present alternative...

This paper analyses the impact of government tax and subsidy policy on immigration of human capital and the effect of such immigration on growth and incomes. In the context of a two-country endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents and human capital accumulation, we argue that human...

We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare. We find that skill-neutral policies are never optimal. An egalitarian welfare function induces a policy that entails moving mainly unskilled immigrants into the rich countries, whereas a welfare function skewed highly towards the rich...

This paper studies the interaction between international migration and intellectual property rights (IPR) in determining innovation performance of developing countries. Although emigration may directly cause brain drain, it generates a flow of knowledge acquired by emigrants abroad back to their...

This paper analyzes the relationship between brain drain, human capital accumulation and individual net incomes in the presence of a redistributional tax policy, credit market constraints, administrative costs of tax collection, and lack of government commitment. We characterize how decreasing...

We study the dynamics in a partnership between a university and a developing region. We examine how the university achieves its goals to improve and advertise its offerings while recruiting a cohort of students from the developing region, and maintaining a sustainable relationship with the...

We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants than for natives. There are two stages. In the first one, workers in the South decide whether to move and...

We ask what level of migration would maximize world welfare. We find that skill-neutral policies are never optimal. An egalitarian welfare function induces a policy that entails moving mainly unskilled immigrants into the rich countries, whereas a welfare function skewed highly towards the rich...