We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

This study analyzes the problem of high or runaway CEO pay packages. These packages reflect substantial lapses of corporate governance by the corporate boards of directors that award the excessive pay. A combination of shareholder impotence, director self-interest and CEO domination has rendered...

Critics allege that executive compensation consultants face potential conflicts of interest (lack of independence) that might lead to higher CEO pay. Conflicts of interest include the desires to "cross-sell" service and to secure "repeat business". Using a unique data set of compensation...

n this paper we examine the agency costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEO's within the FTSE 100 in the last decade. Are CEOs taking a large proportion of the total pot (a big "pay slice") more, or less, able to return value to shareholders by better management? In presenting this...

Debate on the issue of executive pay has intensified after the UK Government published a Green Paper in November 2016 (Green Paper), which discussed, among other things, several concerns with the current regime on executive pay and possible options for reform. In view of the potentially...

This paper investigates the influence of performance related pay on several dimensions of job satisfaction. In cross-sectional estimates, performance related pay is associated with increased overall satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with hours....

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...