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Heterogeneity and the formation of risk-sharing coalitions

Jaramillo, Fernando; Kempf, Hubert; Moizeau, Fabien - In: Journal of development economics 114 (2015), pp. 79-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313725

Rosenmüller, Joachim - 2013

We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 "production factors" that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as "cornered"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009749480

On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players

Bhattacharya, Anindya K.; Ziad, Abderrahmane - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 2/3, pp. 537-552

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624366

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum … bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person … coalition implies social exclusion, since the not chosen member always receives a payoff of zero. Consistent with results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711650

Power, control, and coalition formation

Karos, Dominik - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792284

Coalitional and strategic market games

Brangewitz, Sonja - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009536841

Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts

Bloch, Francis - In: The Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict, (pp. 473-502). 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567911

Outside options in probabilistic coalition situations

Belau-Garmann, Julia - 2011

In this paper, I introduce an extension of (TU) games with a coalition structure. Taking a situation where all … coalitions are already established is not reasonable in order to forecast the reality; there is not only one possible coalition … each possible coalition. This leads to a generalized, probabilistic setting for coalition structures. Probabilistic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934656

The extended and generalized Shapley value : simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

McQuillin, Ben - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 2, pp. 697-721

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003840940

Strong price of anarchy

Andelman, Nir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay - In: Games and economic behavior 65 (2009) 2, pp. 289-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003841153