In alternating-offer bargaining, a seller is "stubborn" if she demands the same asking price more than once. We provide empirical evidence on stubbornness and inform the theoretical literature by analyzing millions of eBay bargaining threads taken from Backus et al. (2020). Focusing on the best...

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises...

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...

Negotiation occurs whenever people cannot achieve their own goals without the cooperation of others. Our review highlights recent empirical research that investigates this ubiquitous social activity. We selectively review descriptive research emerging from social psychology and organizational...

We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and equilibrium payoffs characterized. The transfers between the...