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Langus, Gregor; Lipatov, Vilen - 2022

We study the question whether a holder of standard essential patents (SEPs) should be allowed to choose the level in the value chain at which to offer a FRAND license to its SEPs. We give a pos-itive answer to this question for two reasons. First, the SEP holder and the social planner tend to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012817846

Depreciating Licenses

Weyl, E. Glen - 2020

Many governments assign use licenses for natural resources, such as radio spectrum, fishing rights, and mineral extraction rights, through auctions or other market-like mechanisms. License design affects resource users' investment incentives, as well as the efficiency of asset allocation. No...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822523

Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing

Crama, Pascale - 2015

We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts, when there is incomplete information on the licensee's valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee's development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an upfront payment, milestone payments at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012210

What Aggregate Royalty Do Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2018

in the academic literature and in patent-infringement litigation begs this question: what is the aggregate royalty … article, I first explain Mallinson's methodology. I then separately examine the revenues of major SEP owners, patent pools …, large implementers of SEPs, and patent-assertion entities (PAEs). I show that, even using large assumed values for balancing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919273