We show how to construct optimal policy projections in Ramses, the Riksbank's open-economy medium-sized DSGE model for forecasting and policy analysis. Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the model indicates that they are relatively invariant to alternative policy assumptions and supports...

Evaluating inflation-targeting monetary policy is more complicated than checking whether inflation has been on target, because inflation control is imperfect and flexible inflation targeting means that deviations from target may be deliberate in order to stabilize the real economy. A modified...

Inflation target regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, U.K. and Sweden) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit employment targets. Without employment persistence, 'an inflation target-conservative' central bank eliminates the inflation bias, mimics an optimal...

We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less...

Inflation target regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, U.K. and Sweden) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit employment targets. Without employment persistence, 'an inflation target-conservative' central bank eliminates the inflation bias, mimics an optimal...

This paper studies the relationship between inflation, output, money and interest rates in the euro area, using data spanning 1980-2000. The P model is shown to have considerable empirical support. Thus, the "price gap" or, equivalently, the "real money gap" (the gap between current real...

We outline a method to provide advice on optimal monetary policy while taking policymakers' judgment into account. The method constructs optimal policy projections (OPPs) by extracting the judgment terms that allow a model, such as the Federal Reserve Board staff economic model, FRB/US, to...

The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...