While the Merger Guidelines structure represents the standard approach to merger analysis in the US, economists have proposed methods to dispense with market definition and estimate the competitive effect directly. In this note, we argue that market definition is necessary to evaluate the...

Farrell and Shapiro’s Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) structure is advanced as a technique to screen mergers in differentiated product markets. Lacking an ability to link their analysis with experiences from relevant markets, Farrell and Shapiro propose to assume substantial efficiencies, and...

Farrell and Shapiro’s Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) framework is an innovative and elegant technique designed to evaluate mergers in differentiated product markets. The authors advance their approach primarily as a screen for unilateral effects cases, although others suggest that UPP might be...

Critical Loss analysis is an empirical implementation of the hypothetical monopolist test for market definition contained in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines. As usually applied, the test accepts the proposed market definition as relevant for...

The hypothetical monopolist test has been used to define antitrust markets for over 20 years. However, many of these applications occur within the enforcement agencies and thus the implementation process is not fully transparent to antitrust practitioners. This paper provides a study of 116...

To be admissible in federal court under the Daubert standard, expert economic testimony must be (1) based on scientific analysis and (2) aid the dispute resolution process. Expert evidence should be considered scientific when (1) it meets Karl Popper’s falsification standard and (2) some...

This paper models Federal Trade Commission unilateral effects merger policy using a sample of 184 investigations undertaken between 1993 and 2010. A review of the files suggests that roughly half of the sample is evaluated with a dominant firm/monopoly model, while the rest of the cases require...

It is well known that an optimal merger policy requires consideration of efficiencies in enforcement decisions. However, as understanding of a market's equilibrium structure is required to integrate the efficiency defense into a merger analysis, efficiency evaluations are controversial. New...

This paper explores the use of collusion theories in merger analysis at the Federal Trade Commission. The 1992 Merger Guidelines focuses on unilateral effect, relegating collusion analysis to a second tier theory. Both structural and behavioral conditions conducive to establishing or maintaining...

Most mergers filed at the enforcement agencies are conglomerate in nature with only minor horizontal overlaps. An enforcement agency may challenge the merger, if any overlap is believed to be adversely affected by the transaction. While the merging firm is entitled to a hearing in federal court,...