We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions...

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by comparing the expected returns of alternative choices. The...

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

Wir analysieren erstmalig die Rolle von Zukunftsthemen in Bundestagsreden zwischen 1949 und 2021 mithilfe computerlinguistischer Methoden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Diskurs über Zukunftsthemen im Bundestag mit dem Wirtschaftswunder zwischen den 1960er und 1990er Jahren stark anstieg. Seit...

The European Council is increasingly central to the governance of the European Union. Even if national parliaments have originally focused their involvement in EU affairs on the ordinary legislative process, most of the chambers have started to develop specific activities, before or after...