This paper examines the relationship between managerial stock option holdings and the decision to announce a repurchase of the firm's common stock. Managerial stock option holdings should reinforce the traditional undervaluation, free cash flow, and capital structure motives for repurchases by...

This study examines whether the CEO uses share repurchases to sell her equity grants at inflated stock prices, a concern regularly voiced in politics and media. We find that the timing of buyback programs and equity compensation, i.e., the granting, vesting, and selling of equity, is largely...

Securities regulation must balance the dual objectives of mitigating market abuse and permitting issuers to manage their capital flexibly and efficiently. This paper examines this issue in the specific context of the regulation of share buybacks within the insider dealing framework in a...

This paper finds that CEO stock options influence the choice, amount, and timing of funds distributed as a buyback. These results favor a managerial opportunism motive for buybacks over other theories and support two key research expectations - that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on...