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Reputation for quality and adverse selection

Kawai, Keiichi - In: European economic review : EER 76 (2015), pp. 47-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522836

Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information

Roger, Guillaume - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 5 (2013) 4, pp. 55-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221671

Adverse selection versus moral hazard in financial contracting : evidence from collateralized and non-collateralized loans

Uchida, Hirofumi; Uesugi, Iichiro; Iwaki, Hiromichi - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012132221

Signaling, reputation and spinoffs

Shekhar, Suraj - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 149 (2018), pp. 88-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986023

Collateralization of business loans : testing the prediction of theories

Meles, Antonio; Porzio, Claudio; Sampagnaro, Gabriele; … - In: Research in international business and finance 42 (2017), pp. 922-938

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757291

Should we pay for ecosystem service outputs, inputs or both?

White, Benedict; Hanley, Nick - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 63 (2016) 4, pp. 765-787

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589411

Role of asymmetric information and moral hazard on IPO underpricing and lockup

Hoque, Hafiz - In: Journal of international financial markets, … 30 (2014), pp. 81-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293052

Value of audit for supply chains with hidden action and information

Nikoofal, Mohammad E.; Gümüş, Mehmet - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 285 (2020) 3, pp. 902-915

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239792

On the credibility of ethical banking

Barigozzi, Francesca; Tedeschi, Piero - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 166 (2019), pp. 381-402

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149070

Optimal insurance with adverse selection

Schlee, Edward E.; Chade, Hector - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 571-607

We solve the principal-agent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an \emph{arbitrary} type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689103