Goeree and Holt (2001) experimentally study a number of games. In each case they initially find strong support for Nash equilibrium, however by changing an apparently irrelevant parameter they find results which contradict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we study the five normal form games from...

We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to...

If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the...

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under...

Books reviewed in this article: Gordon Fletcher, Understanding Dennis Robertson: The Man and His Work Robert G. Chambers and John Quiggin, Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism Stephan Boehm, Christian Gehrke, Heinz D....

The evaluations of a repeated lottery with and without the option to sell the second-stage lottery are compared theoretically and experimentally. Comparing individuals' risk attitudes, we find that risk attitudes differ depending on the measure of risk attitude applied. We also find that...

This paper characterizes a family of preference relations over uncertain prospects that (i) are dynamically consistent in the Machina sense and, moreover, for which the updated preferences are also members of this family and (ii) can simultaneously accommodate Ellsberg and Allais type paradoxes....

We analyze three rules for updating neo-additive capacities. Only for Generalized Bayesian Updating is relative optimism the same for both updated and unconditional capacities. For updates of the other two, either the updated capacity is fully optimistic or fully pessimistic.