In this paper, we provide another reason that may explain the adoption of the hub-and-spoke network structure in the airline industry. We show that when an airline has to decide on its capacity before the demand conditions are perfectly known, a hub-and-spoke network structure by pooling...

We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to cooperate. Firms first choose capacity under demand uncertainty, then compete in quantities after the uncertainty has been resolved. We specify strategic alliance (SA) as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity...

In a vertically differentiated market with cost asymmetries, the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium where the high quality is produced by the efficient firm. We show that a sufficiently high Minimum Quality Standard reverses equilibrium selection. Hence, MQS may be used in order to...

In this paper, we analyze cases where consumers are aware of the existence of two qualities but do not know which firm sells the good one. We show that if the production of the high quality requires higher cost, its producer may be severly disadvantaged, even if the additional utility fully...

We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to cooperate. Firms first choose capacity under demand uncertainty then compete in quantities after the uncertainty has been resolved. We specify strategic alliance (SA) as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity...

We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to cooperate. Firms first choose capacity under demand uncertainty then compete in quantities after the uncertainty has been resolved. We specify strategic alliance (SA) as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity...

This paper deals with the consequences of setting a label, on both firms?' price strategies in the case of credence goods. We demonstrate that the high quality firm may be better off in the absence of label.Classification JEL : D82, L15