Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large,...

offered to players in Major League Baseball, focusing on hitters.

type="main" <p>Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a...</p>

type="main" <p>We present field evidence concerning experienced bidders that supports the linkage principle—specifically, the prediction that in affiliated-values auction environments the expected revenues generated at open-outcry, ascending-bid auctions are higher than those under auction...</p>

Governments often sell the right to harvest timber on public land. If timber is of heterogeneous quality and timber pri ces reflect this heterogeneity, then charging a fixed stumpage rate per cubic meter of timber harvested independent of timber quality can induce the economically inefficient...

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from different distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the identity of the...