We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Economic Journal</I> (2014). Volume 124, pages 887-916.<P> In the process of regulatory reform in the electric power industry, the mitigation of market power is one of the basic problems regulators have to deal with. We use experimental data to...</p></i>

We experimentally study the relationship between other-regarding preferences, group identity and political participation. In doing so, we propose a novel group identity induction procedure that succeeds in creating environments where in-group bias is either high or low. At the individual level,...

In a competitive market with taxed transactions, it does not matter under full rationality which side of the market legally transfers the taxes. In the labor market, a tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent. With boundedly rational agents, this...

This paper investigates infrastructure investment in markets where regulation is subject to varying degrees of manipulation by elected politicians. Based on a model of price regulation in a market with increasing demand and long-term returns on investment we construct a multi-period game between...

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

This paper provides experimental evidence showing that indirect reciprocity may important in economic decision making and in the development of group norms. We study a 'repeated helping game' with random pairing in large groups, with individuals equally divided between donors and recipients....

We study how the number of traders affects the interaction between a centralized exchange and bilateral negotiations in an experimental labor market with excess supply and incomplete contracts. Our large markets are three times as large as our small markets. In bilateral negotiations firms...