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Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market
Gayle, George-Levi; Golan, Limor; Miller, Robert Allen - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 83 (2015) 6, pp. 2293-2369
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431546
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A theory of fair ceo pay
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477768
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Wage profiles : the resolution of two-sided moral hazard without reputations
Arvan, Lanny; Esfahani, Hadi Salehi - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000891456
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Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endugenous occupational choice
Ghatak, Maithreesh - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000963160
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Occupational choice and dynamic incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - In: The review of economic studies 68 (2001) 4, pp. 781-810
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001627794
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It's not what you pay it's the way that you pay it and that's what gets results : jockeys' pay and performance
Fernie, Sue; Metcalf, David - In: Labour : review of labour economics and industrial relations 13 (1999) 2, pp. 385-411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001435706
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It's not what you pay it's the way that you pay it and that's what gets results : jockey's pay and performance
Fernie, Sue; Metcalf, David - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000943540
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Optimal managerial remuneration and firm-level diversification
Nier, Erlend W. - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000967591
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Can earnings manipulation create value?
Miglo, Anton - In: Economics, management and financial markets 11 (2016) 1, pp. 21-40
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011809282
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135339