This paper investigates private interest, public interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulation of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners...

This paper explores how organization and contract design has evolved to address regulatory challenges in risk management. In the early part of the century, futures exchanges responded to credit risks by developing clearing houses that act as guarantors. The liability structure of the clearing...

This paper investigates what factors determine whether a commercial banker is on the board of a non-financial firm. We consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in firm management. Given the different payoff...

This paper synthesizes literature on the economics of regulation and positive political economy to provide a framework for understanding why certain types of banking and financial regulations arise in particular circumstance and what causes them to change. The analysis focuses on competition...

We examine the two ways in which U.S. commercial banks organized their investment banking operations before the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act forced the banks to leave the securitiesbusiness: as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated affiliate with its own...

Interest groups cannot enforce contracts with legislators to work in their favor since fee-for-service agreements would be considered bribery. When such contracts are not available, a system of specialized, standing committees can provide a second-best way to maximize contributions, since such a...