We present a model of coalitional property rights (CPR) regimes - regimes in which ownership of a good is attributable to coalitions of various sizes. Specifically, for each good, we define a legal structure that specifies the legal coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that...

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays-education and pay-as-you-go social security-affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs,...

We construct a model of the determination of public funding of education through majority voting. Households have the option of privately supplementing public education. Alternatively, they can opt out of public education completely and choose private education. We find that in general the...

In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revenue is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of...