Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when...

In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a...

We study the Generalized Second Price auctions – a standard method for allocating online search advertising – experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions....

We study decentralized colleges admissions in the face of uncertain student preferences. Enrollment uncertainty causes colleges to strategically target their admissions, forgoing students sought after by others and seeking students overlooked by others. When students' types are multidimensional,...

Utilizing a novel dataset from an online travel intermediary, we study the effects of EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The opt-in requirement of GDPR resulted in 12.5% drop in the intermediary-observed consumers, but the remaining consumers are trackable for a longer period of...

This paper studies the effects of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on the ability of firms to collect consumer data, identify consumers over time, accrue revenue via online advertising, and predict their behavior. Utilizing a novel dataset by an intermediary that spans much...

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept---robust equilibrium---that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred...

This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation. Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. Informational...