This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of bidders in contests with endogenous stochastic entry. I study a standard all-pay auction in which bidders' valuations are commonly known but their participation decisions private. Each potential bidder has to incur an entry cost...

This paper examines the efficiency of stable matchings in a framework of general equilibrium. In my model of a large private competitive economy, firms and managers form partnerships in an upstream labor (matching) market and then firm-manager pairs compete in a downstream goods market. I find...

This paper investigates how externalities from downstream competition shape sorting in upstream labor markets. We model it as a two-stage game: A first stage of simultaneous 1-to-1 matching between firms and managers and a second stage of Cournot competition among matched pairs. If firm...

The contest entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about the value of the prize and has a signal-dependent probability of participation. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids. It is shown that the contest organizer...

This note analyzes the effects of a bid cap in an all-pay auction with incomplete information. I find that a non-trivial bid cap affects an agent's expected payment in three ways: An "anti-competition effect" which is associated with this agent's own signal, a pro-competition "good news effect"...