We propose a new concept for how to make choices in games without assuming an equilibrium. To beat the average means to obtain a higher payoff against the others than the others obtain amongst themselves, for any way in which the game might be played. Only Nash equilibrium strategies can beat...

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The robust version of the problem is distinct in two aspects: (i) the seller minimizes regret rather than maximizes revenue, and (ii) the seller only knows that the true distribution of...

We provide a simple theory of inflation inertia in a staggered price setting framework à la Calvo (1983). Contrary to Calvo's formulation, the frequency of price changes is allowed to vary according to an evolutionary criterion. Inertia is the direct result of gradual adjustment in this...

A decision maker has to recommend a treatment, knows that any outcome will be in [0; 1] but only has minimal information about the likelihood of outcomes (there is no prior). The decision maker can design a finite number of experiments in which treatments are tested. For the case of two...

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments...

The first section briefly summarizes previous results in the literature. In the second section the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is generalized for games with equivalent strategies. Dynamic stability results equivalent to the ones for the traditional definition of an ESS are...

Consider a decision maker who must coordinate his decision with the occurrence of some phenomenon. In order to behave "optimally," the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the phenomenon must be learned. However, there are natural bounds on the capabilities of perception. More...

Regret minimizing strategies for repeated games have been receiving increasing attention in the literature. These are simple adaptive behavior rules that exhibit nice convergence properties. If all players follow regret minimizing strategies, their average joint play converges to the set of...