We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the support of the possible valuations and has no further distributional information. The seller is solving this choice...

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradients for functions (utilities). The lexicographic order, albeit not representable, has an ordient. Not only binary relations representable by differentiable functions have an...

Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

We call a set of strategies "uniformly evolutionary stable" if the following holds after a small mutation of a monomorphic population playing a strategy in the set: a) No mutant strategy can spread. b) Mutant strategies not in the set will be driven out. c) The meaning of a "small mutation" can...

We consider the model of social learning by Schlag (1996). Individuals must repeatedly choose an action in a multi-armed bandit. We assume that each indivdiual observes the outcomes of two other individuals' choices before her own next choice must be made -- the original model only allows for...

A partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973], Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium...

We show how to derive nonparametric estimates from results for Bernoulli distributions, provided the means are the only parameters of interest. The only information is that the support of each random variable is contained in a known bounded set. Examples include presenting minimax risk...