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We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in co-investment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941020
We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation (see p.43, Topkis (1998)). We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013010959
We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859020
We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility...
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This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993421
We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a max-convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas’ five player game with a unique stable set different from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010995367
For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851444