The authors develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs.

This paper provides a methodology to study coalition formation problems with externalities and heterogeneous players, whensome subset of the players can act as "coalition developers" over time. The framework provided here allows to explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions, the...

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.

The aim of this note is about the formalization of the problem of open- access natural resourses by the prisonner's dilemma game. The extreme simplification of the metaphor between prisonner's dilemma and the "tragedy of the commons" leads to imagine only two strategies...

This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition and locational choice that incorporates the notion of regional industrial systems. Firms play a non cooperative game where the strategy set of firms is given by a set of existing industrial districts. Each firm is distinguished by its...

An axiomatization of the interactions between the palyers of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, the authors give an...