This article establishes versions of Moulin's (Public Choice 35:437-455, 1980) characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line. Two results are established...

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

The belief that both the behavior and outcomes of students are affected by their peers is important in shaping education policy. I analyze two polar education systems -tracking and mixing- and propose several criteria for their comparison. I find that tracking is the system that maximizes...

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

We consider a model of polluting firms subject to tax on emissions, monitoring, and penalties in case of underreporting and which face a choice between a more expensive clean and a less expensive dirty technology. Moreover, emissions are subject to random events.We show that the optimal...

This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In...

This paper studies how the emergence of specialized communication media focused on both high quality contents and high quality advertised products, affects the functioning of a vertically differentiated market. To that end, we formulate a simultaneous game of pricing and targeted advertising...

This paper proves stronger versions of the Gibbard random dictatorship theorem using induction on the number of voters. It shows that when there are at least three voters, every random social choice function defined on a domain satisfying a Free Triple at the Top property and satisfying a weak...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77-99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks' profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in...