This paper analyzes the joint design of innovation and competition policy. It focuses on collusion sustainability changes due to implementation of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies in an extension of a model by Miyagiwa (2009). Generic subsidies for R&D are found not to facilitate collusion,...

We investigate the dimensions through which R&D spillovers are propagated across firms via cooperation through Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We build on the framework developed by Bloom et al. (2013) which considers the opposing effects of technology spillovers and product market rivalry, and...

We investigate the dimensions through which R&D spillovers are propagated across firms via cooperation through Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We build on the framework developed by Bloom et al. (2013) which considers the opposing effects of technology spillovers and product market rivalry, and...

The paper analyzes the profitability of RDcooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers RDcompetition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers RDcartelization to RJV cartelization when...

A patent challenger who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced sharing undercuts an alleged infringer's incentive to stay in the fight to the finish - especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement. Too many...