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Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value...
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There are a number of examples in the auction literature (Perry and Reny, 1999, and Krishna, 2002) where releasing the seller's private information can lead to a lowering of expected revenue. On the other hand, releasing information always increases welfare. Levin and Smith (1994) point out that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181973
The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean...
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In this note we examine four standard multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in the presence of synergy. The structure of the equilibrium bidding strategy under each rule is quite intuitive. Whether the equilibrium involves "bundle-bidding" or "separating-bidding" strategy depends on the presence of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416965
Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753271
Should a seller use a multi-unit auction for identical and indivisible units of a good? We show, under specific assumptions on the value distributions of the bidders, that in large markets the multi-unit format generates higher (lower) expected revenue compared to the bundled format when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744351
There are a number of examples in the auction literature (Perry and Reny, 1999, and Krishna, 2002) where releasing the seller's private information can lead to a lowering of expected revenue. On the other hand, releasing information always increases welfare. Levin and Smith (1994) point out that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629873