In the standard independent private values (IPV)model, each bidder’s beliefs about the values of any other bidder is represented by a unique prior. In this paper we relax this assumption and study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders have an...

I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other...

It is often claimed that e-commerce has created a more competitive environment by encouraging the entry of new online firms and by enabling buyers to search easily for the lowest prices. The limited evidence that exists paints a mixed picture. Many online markets are advertising- and...

We consider a model in which productive bilateral links are formed between heterogeneous agents who differ in their innate productivity. Local information is complete but an outside planner can observe only network properties. We ask if consistent credit rating -- where agents' ratings are...

We study elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent facing ambiguity (model uncertainty): the agent has a non-singleton set of (first-order) priors on an event and a second-order prior on these first-order belief-states. Such a two-stage decomposition of uncertainty and non-reduction of...