In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of a family of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (Soc Choice Welf 27:171–197, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2005</CitationRef>) for voting rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting systems, called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting”, where each voter rates each candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. In approval...

Different from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We...

In this paper we propose a simple model for measuring ‘success’ or ‘decisiveness’ in voting situations. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting rule and the voters’ behavior. The voting rule specifies when a proposal is to be accepted or...

We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Our...

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös-Renyi random networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a given social...