. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalitions' aggregate payoff at a Nash equilibrium …

shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset … of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The … small stable coalition is not very effec- tive in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The …

repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition …