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We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006141
A common means of incorporating non-verifiable performance measures in compensation contracts is via bonus pools. We study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852752
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050290
In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050659
In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054426
To generate downstream sales, manufacturers often spend both effort and compensation when working with their dealers. Existing theories are inconclusive about the interdependent role of the two kinds of instruments in motivating dealer effort; that is, whether they are substitutes or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928835
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033647
address these and other questions, we introduce relational incentives theory, which distinguishes between two aspects of ….g., monetary vs. non-monetary incentives). Our theory highlights the importance of schemes, with a focus on how they interact with … model. The theory thus contributes to research on relational models by showing how people constitute and modulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211786
This paper investigates the pricing effects of financial innovation in an economy with endogenous participation and heterogeneous income risks. The introduction of non-redundant assets endogenously modifies the participation set, reduces the covariance between dividends and participants'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012752713
This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012716255