Similar Search Results

Message-contingent delegation

Krähmer, Daniel - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 60 (2006) 4, pp. 490-506

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003357730

Plural form in franchising : an incomplete contracting approach

Hendrikse, George W. J.; Jiang, Tao - In: Economics and management of networks : franchising, …, (pp. 13-29). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003435714

Governance inseparability in franchising : multi-case study in France and Brazil

Azevedo, Paulo F.; Silva, Vivian L. S. - In: Economics and management of networks : franchising, …, (pp. 97-115). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003435815

Agency theory : incomplete contracting and ownership structure

Clacher, Iain; Hillier, David; McColgan, Patrick - In: Corporate governance : a synthesis of theory, research, …, (pp. 141-156). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702128

Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities

Gans, Joshua - In: Economics letters 93 (2006) 2, pp. 242-247

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391927

Vesting and control in venture capital contracts

Skeie, David R. (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003522845

Economists' perspectives on leadership

Bolton, Patrick; Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad; Veldkamp, … - In: Handbook of leadership theory and practice : an HBS …, (pp. 239-264). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942591

Coase (1937) revisited : endogenous fiat in firms and markets

Zanarone, Giorgio - In: International review of economics : journal of civil economy 59 (2012) 2, pp. 201-221

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009570077

Dynamic competing mechanisms

Ghosh, Sambuddha; Han, Seungjin - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573516

The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance

Gächter, Simon; Kessler, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - 2011

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153163